Grilling D.P.

Today, we’re sitting down with Dave Powell, noted Civil War historian and author of the soon to be released The Atlanta Campaign Volume I: Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864, via Savas Beatie, the first in a five-part series covering this seminal campaign of the Civil War. 

    This new book, scheduled for release on July 6, 2024, is available for pre-order directly from Savas Beatie or through Amazon at the links below:

Savas Beatie direct: The Atlanta Campaign Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville (Preferred)

Amazon: The Atlanta Campaign Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville (if you must support the Empire, please be sure to leave a review) 

See more details here and add it to your wishlist: https://www.savasbeatie.com/the-atlanta-campaign-volume-1-dalton-to-cassville-may-1-19-1864/

Dave Powell's latest work The Atlanta Campaign Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville tips the scales at 624 pages and offers the most in-depth study to date of this crucial western theater campaign. "While Grant and Lee grappled like wrestlers, Sherman and Johnston parried and feinted like fencers," says Powell. "Johnston eschewed the offensive while hoping to lure Sherman into headlong assaults against fortified lines. Sherman disliked the uncertainty of battle and preferred maneuvering." 

    To start off, let’s discuss a bit about your writing and research processes. Tackling a four-month long campaign with five volumes appears to be a daunting task from both a research and writing perspective. How did you organize the mass of documents needed for a project of this size and scope? Any pointers for other historians contemplating tackling projects of this magnitude?

DP: Dan, I approach all my research projects the same way — by order of battle. Today those sources are all scanned and placed in folders, though in the past I used 3-ring binders.  So, for example, all the regiments in a brigade are together, all the brigades of a single division are in sub-folders of that divisional folder, etc. This allows me to easily compare and contrast accounts from different participants of the same action. Specialty studies such as logistics, morale, and the like get their own folders, or at least a notation in my active writing document as to where to find that pertinent material.

Readers are often curious as to how their favorite authors construct their books. What did a typical writing day look like during the production phase for The Atlanta Campaign?

DP: I generally spend about 4 hours writing, usually in the morning. I take a break — walking one of the dogs, then reading — and sometimes get back to it in the afternoons, though that time is often used for editing existing chapters or organizing new research finds.

So much of historical study revolves around identifying and utilizing the best primary sources to complete the narrative. In a project like this, the list of sources consulted runs into the hundreds, even the thousands. What was your research technique to a) uncover these sources, and b) sift through the mass of accounts to highlight the most enlightening sources?

DP: Since so much of my writing involves tactical action or movements, I start with the units involved. I try and find the pertinent part of every source (day of diary, memoir, etc.) and compare them to see how they stack up. Given the quantity of sources, as often as not I have more first-rate quotable material than I can use in the chapter.

This also means that I read and re-read material many times over the course of a project, and when I come across (or rediscover) sources that would be useful in other contexts, I make a note in my active word file.

Dave Powell stands at left with the legendary Jim Ogden, chief historian at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park during one of the Seminar in the Woods tours. 

One of the challenges we have discussed previously is the gross imbalance between Federal and Confederate sources, particularly in the western theater. Oftentimes, the ratio of Federal to Confederate sources runs 4:1 or more in favor of the Federals. How do you strike the proper balance between Confederate and Union sources so crucial for balanced history?

DP: Well, you can’t-at least not entirely. Which means I must make the best of the sources I do have. In this regard I think the use of period newspapers is invaluable, since it helps us fill in gaps—if only imperfectly—in the existing reports and memoirs. I suspect I spent twice as much time hunting CS materials as I do Federal sources.

How did your training at the Virginia Military Institute prepare you for your writing career? Did your love for the Civil War predate your time at VMI?

DP: I was a history major, and I wrote a lot of papers. While that training was not specific to VMI, it is the best sort of training for any aspiring writer. I had several influential professors who insisted that I take courses that made me write: English, History, Literature, etc. A number of them were combat veterans, and because VMI was oriented towards military service, their instruction echoed that orientation.

I was indeed a Civil War student before VMI, but the Institute’s storied history in that war definitely sparked a deeper study. I became a reenactor at VMI, joining the Civil War Round Table, where we did both battlefield trips and living history weekends at New Market, VMI’s own battlefield.

What is your most enjoyable part of the book writing process and why? Least favorite and why?

DP: I love the research. It is a hunt, and the thrill of finding a great source gets me going. I also love the writing, when it gets into the right rhythm and flows easily. I used to dislike editing, but I find now that beginning my day by editing yesterday’s work soon recaptures that flow, even if I begin the day not in the mood to work. Since I am not very visually oriented, I don’t like hunting down images and securing their use; that can be both time consuming and frustrating. And, since I index all my own books, I dislike indexing.

By the time of the Atlanta campaign, the boys of '61 shown in these early war images had turned into flint-eyed veterans and the intensity of the combat which characterized the Atlanta campaign was imprinted heavily by this fact. Robert Charles Findley of the 74th Ohio is pictured at left while Private Charles Wesley Sadler of the 17th Tennessee is pictured at right. 

Let’s discuss the Atlanta campaign and your new book specifically. For more than a century, Jacob Cox’s 1882 book on the campaign was the only treatment of the campaign as a whole until the early 1990s when Rick Baumgartner and Larry Strayer’s Echoes of Battle Atlanta and Albert Castel’s Decision in the West were published. Since then, numerous books have been published on various aspects of the campaign; that said, why did you feel the time was ripe for the Atlanta campaign to receive a fresh examination?

DP: While those books are all excellent in their own way, I wanted to tell a more comprehensive story, one that would integrate as many voices as possible, and also expand on actions previously given short shrift. The Battle of Resaca, for example, gets a far deeper treatment here than it ever has before. I also wanted to have an operational flow to the campaign. Individual battle narratives don’t do that; but Atlanta, like the Overland Campaign in Virginia, was more than the sum of a few battles.

As you wrote this first volume, did you discover anything that surprised you?

DP: There are always discoveries. My opinions changed concerning Snake Creek Gap (James B. McPherson, May 9, 1864) for example, especially regarding his decision to use his cavalry to guard his rear rather than lead his advance.

William Tecumseh Sherman and Joseph Eggleston Johnston developed a great respect for one another in later years. Johnston appreciated Sherman's magnanimity handling the final surrender of the western Confederate army at Bennett Place and served as an honorary pallbearer at Sherman's funeral on February 19, 1891.  Out of respect for Sherman he refused to wear his hat in the cold rain that marked the funeral procession. "If I were in his place and he was standing here in mine, he would not put on his hat." Johnston developed a cold soon thereafter which worsened into pneumonia. He died in Washington, D.C. about a month later on March 21, 1891.  

The same armies that met at Chickamauga in September 1863 would meet again during the Atlanta campaign, but both had undergone significant changes, particularly in leadership, during the intervening period. Could you please assess how the leadership styles of William T. Sherman and Joseph E. Johnston transformed their respective armies? Or did the changes occur independent of army leadership?

DP: Sherman’s job was to meld three different armies into a single force. He also reacted to the three armies in different ways. He was often impatient with Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland but less exacting on McPherson or Schofield. By and large, however, he expected the Army of the Cumberland to do the heavy fighting — when he chose to fight.

Johnston initially appeared to be the man who could finally resolve the officer turmoil that bedeviled the Army of Tennessee, but as it turned out, he was unable to do so. He managed to keep the army better fed and supplied than it had been since the early days of 1862, as well. His best strength was anticipating Sherman’s flanking moves and reacting, but his main weakness was in failing to seize other opportunities when Sherman left himself open to a counterstroke.

The style of fighting during the Atlanta campaign and especially its intensity was a marked departure from the style of warfare that predominated from 1861-1863 in the western theater. What factors drove this change? Was it the topography of northern Georgia? The increasing experience level of the common soldier? Leadership changes? Other factors?

DP: The large-scale appearance of field fortifications was not just confined to the West, for as we see, Grant and Lee were soon locked in continuous trench warfare as well. That was largely a bottom-up affair, as the men availed themselves of whatever protection they could create. However, both Johnston and the Union commanders—particularly Thomas and McPherson—fully embraced the innovation, something Sherman found occasionally irksome when he was impatient for action. The change was too significant for senior officers to override with much success, however.

One of the more dramatic episodes of the Battle Resaca occurred in the evening of May 15, 1864 when the 5th Ohio Infantry crawled ahead of the lines, attached ropes to the abandoned pieces belonging to Captain Max van den Corput's Cherokee Light Artillery, and dragged them back to Union lines. 

The first major battle of the campaign took place at Resaca on May 13-15, 1864. It was an indecisive engagement, but what did the fighting there illuminate about the strengths and weaknesses of the respective armies? How did Johnston and Sherman feel about their respective armies’ performance during the engagement?

DP: Sherman launched a series of unsuccessful attacks, the bloodiest of which were made by Schofield’s XXIII Corps, which clearly suffered from leadership issues. Ironically, Johnston, who is generally not regarded as offensive-minded, attacked twice at Resaca, which cost his army heavily, offsetting the Federal losses. The real star of the battle was Federal artillery, which dominated — even intimidated — the Confederate commanders. Union guns weighed heavily on their thinking for much of the rest of the campaign.

During the first 20 days of the Atlanta campaign, which generals (from either side) delivered provided the best generalship, and which left something to be desired?

DP: On the Confederate side, Leonidas Polk did surprisingly well, given his reputation, as did Hardee. I think Johnston was too passive and often indecisive. Hood was also mercurial.

On the Federal side, McPherson was clearly the wrong choice for army command — something that will be more evident in Volume II than in Volume I. Hooker and the XX Corps did much of the hardest fighting. I think the Army of the Cumberland proved the most reliable overall.

Brigadier General Thomas W. Sweeny

When studying a campaign, we often run into personalities or characters that played a role in the campaign that we’d either heard little or nothing about previously. Did you discover any particularly intriguing or surprising “characters” along the path to publication? Could you tell us a little about them and what you found intriguing?

DP: Well, there is one—armed Tom Sweeny, the Federal divisional commander who later helped lead the Fenian invasion of Canada, in 1866. During a lull in the campaign, he sent a message across the lines trying to recruit Patrick Cleburne for that cause. Cleburne turned him down. There are so many personalities and bit players in the campaign, it is hard to narrow them down. I will also admit to great admiration for John M. Palmer, whom I think is largely underrated.

What is your overall assessment of Johnston’s generalship in the opening weeks of the Atlanta campaign? And how about Sherman?

DP: Both had missteps, but Johnston’s were worse. Despite having months of lead time and a broadly stated plan to conduct a defensive-offensive, Johnston was simply unprepared to do so. Though I am not one who thinks Johnston was particularly blindsided at Snake Creek Gap, I do think he repeatedly missed important counterattack opportunities, and he failed to inspire his commanders at Cassville.

Sherman’s errors were of a less significant nature. His opening moves were adroit and effective, all while avoiding the huge losses Grant was suffering in Virginia.

The Atlanta campaign has sometimes been described as a series of missed opportunities- which were those key missed opportunities in the opening weeks of the campaign?

DP: Snake Creek Gap was NOT one, for a variety of boring logistical reasons. But Sherman’s army was divided by the Oostenaula River on May 16, and Johnston could have attacked with a good chance of success — he seemed oblivious to the opportunity, however. I also think that the most important aspect of “The Cassville Affair” where Johnston tried to entrap Sherman, an effort that is usually regarded as a failure only because of the Rebel generals, misses the point that Sherman never actually took Johnston’s bait. There never was an opportunity at Cassville on May 19.

Interestingly, both armies relied upon the same railroad line, the Western & Atlantic, for their supplies during much of the Atlanta campaign. What could you tell us about the logistics efforts of both armies and how they impacted the campaign?

DP: Sherman’s logistics where head and shoulders above Johnston’s, largely through the vastly better materiel support the North could provide. Johnston’s key logistical bottleneck was not the railroad, for the Army of Tennessee was supplied quite well during this campaign, but his relative lack of wagons, which meant he could not cut loose from his rail line for an extended period the way Sherman was able to.

Colonel Robert H.G. Minty (left) commanded a Federal cavalry brigade in Sherman's army while Colonel Henry B. Ashby (right) took command of a Confederate cavalry brigade in Johnston's army in mid-June 1864. 

One of your previous books Failure in the Saddle examined the decline in effectiveness of the Confederate cavalry in the west as the war progressed. How did this degradation play out in the Atlanta campaign and what impact did it have on the campaign’s outcome?

DP: Actually, in the first months of the campaign the Confederate cavalry dominated the Federal mounted arm. They had more men, and also, at least two of the Federal cavalry commanders—George Stoneman and Kenner Garrard—were simply not good cavalrymen. Johnston kept a much tighter leash on Joe Wheeler than had Bragg, and it showed. Further, Confederate cavalryman William H. Jackson, commanding the division Polk brought from Mississippi, proved highly capable. The Federals really needed unity of command and more effective leadership at the corps and divisional level.

 One of the joys of researching a book like this traveling to the area and becoming familiar with not only the battlefields, but also the byroads and out of the way spaces that many visitors would miss. And if you’re traveling in the South, there are always great hidden restaurants and backwoods barbecue joints to discover. Any new favorite eateries you discovered while researching this book?

DP: I can heartily recommend Thatcher’s, in Calhoun, for one. Dalton also has some pretty good restaurants downtown near the railroad tracks.

Do you have any favorite road stories accumulated while researching this series? Any favorite battlefields, museums, or archives that you discovered along the way?

DP: One fascinating place is the 103rd Ohio Museum, just west of Cleveland on the shore of Lake Erie. The museum is in one of the buildings that comprised the 103rd Ohio’s Reunion campground, bought by the veterans and still owned by their descendants to this day. You need to call ahead to visit, but I was really impressed by the commitment of this group, which is still in existence.

Another favorite spot — or really two spots — are two hilltops at Dallas, Georgia, both still with earthworks intact. One is where the 31st Iowa was stationed, until driven off by the 9th Kentucky, (CS), and the other is where De Gress’s Federal battery was deployed. Both hills allow for a much better understanding of what happened at Dallas.

Dave with fellow Chickamauga author and tour guide Robert Carter

Any thoughts of doing a Seminar in the Woods-style event for the Atlanta campaign, perhaps at Resaca or Kenesaw Mountain?

DP: Not at this time. The more seminars I do, the less time I have to write. That said, I would not say no to participating in such a weekend organized by someone else. Mind you, the nearer to Atlanta you get, the more traffic you fight and the less interpretation you can do.

We know that you are actively engaged in writing volume 2 of the series. When might readers expect to see this second volume in print? Do you have a publication schedule in mind for the remainder of the series?

DP: As of this writing (June 23, 2024) I am about ¾ done with volume II. I fully expect it to be published in 2025, and plan on doing a volume a year after that — so a completion date of 2028.

To order your copy of this important new title, click on the links below to place your pre-order from Savas Beatie or through Amazon:

Savas Beatie direct: The Atlanta Campaign Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville (Preferred)

Amazon: The Atlanta Campaign Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville (if you must support the Empire, please be sure to leave a review) 

See more details here and add it to your wishlist: https://www.savasbeatie.com/the-atlanta-campaign-volume-1-dalton-to-cassville-may-1-19-1864/