General Negley on the Formation of the Pennsylvania Brigade

Until the fall of 1863, only a total of three Pennsylvania infantry regiments were assigned to the Army of the Cumberland, the 77th, 78th, and 79th. All three of these regiments arrived in the western theater in the fall of 1861 as part of Brigadier General James S. Negley’s brigade. 

    In the following article written for the Pittsburgh Dispatch newspaper, General Negley explained how he procured authority to raise the brigade, how it was formed, and how it came to be assigned to the western theater. Among the notables who make appearances in General Negley’s narrative include Andrew Carnegie, Andrew Curtin, Simon Cameron, Winfield Scott, William Tecumseh Sherman, and even President Abraham Lincoln.

 

Brigadier (later Major) General James Scott Negley, a horticulturalist and militia general from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, strikes a Napoleonic post in a CDV taken at Nashville in 1862. Negley would advance from brigade to division command in the Army of the Cumberland, earning much praise for his defense of Nashville in the fall of 1862 and his division's performance at Stones River. All of this would be undone at the second day of Chickamauga. 

          The month of August 1861 is memorable for great emergencies. Incidents born of an hour became historical epochs. The city of Washington was the storm center of military and political activity. The mustering out of my command of three months’ men [Negley led a brigade in General Robert Patterson’s army] necessitated a visit to the capital to close up my accounts. I found the hotels thronged with soldiers, prophets of evil, politicians, mercenaries, and adventurers. The spirit of disloyalty among the citizens was but illy concealed. Sutlers, camp followers, and demoralized soldiers who had precipitately fled from Bull Run had created a hysterical condition of fear.

          Heavy detachments of men were busily employed in throwing up works to resist Beauregard’s army which, at that time, did not exceed 40,000 poorly equipped soldiers, inferior in numbers and equipment to the army commanded by General McClellan. Apprehensions of an immediate assault dominated and swayed every other consideration. Aides and orderlies dashed from the military headquarters like arrows sprung from a bow. Vacillation of purpose and uncertainty in regard to a general plan of resistance were easily noticeable and accounted for the complex and hesitating movements of our forces elsewhere. The full tide of the reserve power and confidence of the North was just coming in.

          According to usage, I reported to the Secretary of War Simon Cameron. I found a large number of eager applicants awaiting an audience. I was promptly ushered in by an aide and after a few words of friendly greeting said, “Mr. Cameron, I wish authority to recruit a brigade of infantry and a company of artillery.” He answered, “Why do you wish to raise of company of artillery?” I replied that I preferred campaigning in the West and knew that artillery was greatly needed there. He quickly said, “Let us go over and talk with the President.”

General Negley's interview with fellow Pennsylvanian Simon Cameron netted him an audience with President Lincoln and the authority he sought to raise a brigade for service in the West. 

          We found President Lincoln holding an animated conversation with Secretary Salmon P. Chase. I observed a feeling of coolness between the two secretaries, presumably because Secretary Chase was the recognized spokesman of the clique who was secretly influencing the President to dismiss Cameron as Secretary of War. Mr. Cameron, addressing the President, said, “General Negley was with Patterson and commanded one of his best brigades. He asks authority to recruit another brigade and a battery of artillery. I wish you would allow him to do so. We can trust him.”

          Mr. Lincoln turned in his chair and putting himself at ease asked me a number of questions in regard to Patterson’s campaign which exhibited a marvelous quickness of thought and a remarkable knowledge of military details. Feeling I was undergoing a preliminary examination, I expressed my opinion without reserve saying that General Patterson was embarrassed by conflicting orders. He was charged with an aggressive movement and yet the Rhode Island regiment and battery (1,200 strong altogether) and his battalion of Regulars were withdrawn on the eve of crossing the Potomac. He was urged to greater activity but restricted by the cautious advice that the enemy was dangerously strong, but if they refused battle, would be driven towards Washington.

          I said the consensus of opinion of the commanders of Patterson’s brigades, with the exception of General Abercrombie who opposed any advance, was in opposition to the movement on Winchester via Martinsburg believing that it was an irreparable blunder. Our column was too remote from support to operate on an exterior line. With Beauregard and Johnston between McDowell and Patterson, our strategic point was Charleston or Strasburg. So long as our movements threatened either flank Johnston would remain at Winchester.

President Abraham Lincoln

As a matter of fact, Johnston was ordered to Manassas. Although he made a forced march he did not reach there, but guided by the firing, he passed in the rear of Beauregard’s right at a critical junction when the two brigades holding that position were nearly annihilated. It was this unexpected appearance of reinforcements, not a resolute charge, that decided the battle in favor of the enemy. We all shared in General Patterson’s humiliation but would not admit that he was responsible for it. Mr. Lincoln turned to Secretary Cameron and said, “Cameron, let us commission Negley a brigadier now.” Camerson replied, “No, we need the troops and Negley is well known in Pennsylvania and will get us good men.”

I was thrilled with pleasure and profuse in thanks to both the President and Secretary Cameron for their confidence and asked to have written authority at once to procure clothing and equipment wherever they could be found, having been informed that there was no surplus military stores. I also asked permission to establish my camp at Harrisburg. Cameron said, “Come over to the office and we will give you the order” and the letter was written and placed in my hands within the hour.

This transaction is referred to with particularity to show the exigencies of the government at the time with the further wish to note the patriotic courage and tireless energy of Secretary Cameron in recruiting and equipping troops. His willful disregard of the narrow, technical, and obsolete rules of the War Office constituted an unpardonable offense to those in charge of the several departments who were too military to be effective in war.

I next called at the headquarters of General Winfield Scott. I had not spoken to him since the debarkation of his troops at Vera Cruz in the Mexican war. Of all the great captains, he was my ideal. He possessed the most impressive personality of any officer in our army. The conquest of Mexico with his small army was a brilliant series of masterful maneuvers, faultless strategy, quick action, and dauntless courage.

When his aide introduced me, his cold, indifferent manner fairly chilled me, but I quickly said, “I served under you General during the Mexican war. Do you remember the 1st Pennsylvania regiment when it charged up and swept over the sand ridges at Vera Cruz? You said it was splendidly done. If you do, I was present on that occasion.”

Lieutenant General Winfield Scott

The mention of that incident awakened cherished memories, the rich fruit of sunnier days. General Scott arose, steadying himself with difficulty, and reaching out his hand and said, “General, I am delighted to see you. Sit down.” We then chatted for a few moments. When I remarked that there was seemingly a great want of discipline in the city, he remarked, “How I wish I had one of those divisions that served with me in Mexico! My orders here are misunderstood or disobeyed. I am wearied to death with the confusion which reigns supreme. The belief that Washington will be assaulted and taken by storm frightens everybody, interferes with my plan of campaign, and retards our movements. I am weary of it all.”

I did not meet General George McClellan on that visit. When I called, he was on the point of leaving, surrounded by numerous staff, superbly mounted and richly attired, followed by an escort of the U.S. dragoons. Fickle fortune was enamored of him and even during these portentous happenings was alluring him into the quicksands of politics.

I proceeded to Harrisburg, stated my mission to Governor Andrew Curtin, and received from him the heartiest cooperation. The 79th Pennsylvania under Colonel Henry A. Hambright was recruited in Lancaster County with the exception of one company which was organized in Washington County. The 78th Pennsylvania under Colonel William Sirwell was recruited in the counties bordering on the Allegheny River. The 77th Pennsylvania under Colonel T.S. Stambaugh came from the Cumberland Valley. The company of artillery under Captain Mueller [26th Pennsylvania Battery] was recruited in the vicinity of Erie.

Only a small portion of these troops were concentrated at Harrisburg; the greater number rendezvoused at Pittsburgh shortly before their departure for the West. The material for the clothing and camp equipment was procured by me in the open market and made to order. The ordnance and ammunition, together with the horses and harness for the battery, was procured at the arsenal in Pittsburgh. On September 27, 1861, I received an order from Washington to provide water transportation for my command and proceed without delay to the Kanawha Valley and report to General William S. Rosecrans.

Governor Andrew Curtin of
Pennsylvania

Only a small portion of the supplies had been delivered and the organization of the regiments was incomplete but aided by the earnest zeal of the officers and the intelligence and patriotism of the men, the brigade was soon put in a position of readiness to start on its mission. Shortly after midnight on October 12th, a passenger from the telegraph office at the Union depot of the Pennsylvania Railroad notified me that the President and Secretary of War wished to talk with me over their private wire.

When I arrived at the office, I found Mr. Andrew Carnegie, the special operator. The President’s first inquiry was “How soon could you put you command in readiness to leave?” I answered, “In six days.” Then came the question of whether I had found transportation. I answered that I had taken care of the necessary steps to procure light draft steamers which would enable me to transport my battalions and disembark them quickly should we meet with opposition at any point on the river. I was then informed that I should proceed to Louisville and report to Colonel William T. Sherman, but that I must move with great caution and be prepared to resist attack while en route. The enemy was concentrated in strong force on the Kanawha and in other parts of western Virginia and that in all probability we would have to fight them before we reached Louisville.

On returning to camp, I immediately perfected arrangements for a speedy departure. Governor Curtin, who had followed the movements of the brigade with watchful solicitude, informed me that he desired to present to each of the regiments a stand of state colors. I designated the 18th of October for the ceremony. Although the day was wet and disagreeable, the entire city entered into the affair with enthusiasm and greeted with cheers the finely equipped and soldierly looking companies while marching through the streets. I remember Governor Curtin saying, “General Negley, you command 3,000 of Pennsylvania’s noblest sons. I have watched you while you formed this body of men and you have had the protection of the Commonwealth. You have done it well and quickly. You have important duties yet before you yet you have been tried and I am confident you will perform them well.”

Six side-wheel steamers constituted the flotilla. They presented a novel and interesting pageant as they floated into the stream and moved off in columns of twos. The journey to Louisville was uneventful. Arms and ammunition were distributed among the troops en route. Every precaution was taken to guard against an attack. We reached Louisville at a most critical period. Zollicoffer, Marshall, and Hindman were marching in the direction of the city with the intention of coercing the Union men into the army and forcing the state to secede. The Rebels were already in possession of the railroad between Nashville and Louisville and were concentrating a considerable force at Green River, also at Crab Orchard.

Depiction from the Pittsburgh Dispatch of the flotilla of six steamers that carried General Negley's Pennsylvanians to Louisville in October 1861. 

General Robert Anderson, who had been placed in command at Louisville, became disheartened and doubting his ability to hold the place, had resigned. Colonel Sherman with nervous energy had the rare faculty of quickly appreciating the task before him. He had begun the work of organization, hoping to raise sufficient force to drive the enemy beyond the Cumberland River. The seriousness of the situation and the tireless zeal of Colonel Sherman made me a frequent visitor at his headquarters, and I recall with never fading distinctness his bold criticisms and fierce denunciation of the torpor in Washington. “Why a general should be incarcerated as an idiot who questions the opinion that it will require 200,000 men to keep the Rebels south of the Tennessee,” he said. “Anderson was not willing to be made a sacrifice and if I cannot secure proper support, neither will I submit.”

          His determined effort to secure the necessary complement of troops and supplies with his bold criticisms of the methods at Washington made him unpopular as well as the victim of cruel misrepresentations. He was superseded by General Don Carlos Buell, an officer of ability, an accomplished gentleman who would have attained greater success if he had been permitted to plan his campaign without restrictions from the capitol. He was cautioned, indeed, instructed, not to interfere with the ‘domestic institutions’ of the citizens. Plainly expressed, he was to preserve slavery and permit the crops to be grown by the slaves to feed Rebel troops.

Source:

“Negley’s Narrative of the Organization and Campaigning of His Famous Brigade,” Major General James S. Negley, Pittsburgh Dispatch (Pennsylvania), unknown date (1880s)


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