When Forrest Came to Dinner: The Federal Defeat at Murfreesboro
The Confederate victory at the First Battle of Murfreesboro, Tennessee on July 13, 1862 marked the beginning of a resurgence of Confederate fortunes in the western theater that dovetailed with Confederate victories back east in turning the tides of war. The first six months of 1862 had been marked by disaster and defeat for the western Confederates. Since the turn of the year, Confederate armies had been driven out of Kentucky, lost Forts Henry and Donelson then control of Nashville, lost at Pea Ridge in Arkansas, lost New Madrid and Island No. 10 along the Mississippi, fought and lost a tremendous battle at Shiloh, lost New Orleans, and then evacuated Corinth, Mississippi. In early June, the Federal brown water navy had won a decisive victory at the Battle of Memphis that gave control of the Mississippi River to that point to the Union, and already naval patrols were starting to range further south towards Vicksburg. The closure of the Mississippi would sever the Confederacy and with Federal armies already penetrating into the deep South, the end of the dream of Southern independence was a grim possibility.
Entering the picture was a rough-hewn Memphis businessman,
planter, and slave trader turned cavalry commander named Nathan Bedford
Forrest. Forrest, although completely unschooled in military affairs, was
proving himself to be an exceptionally talented soldier as his exploits at Fort
Donelson, Nashville, and Shiloh gained much notice in the army. With the
Federal armies spread across Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, Forrest
resolved to launch a cavalry raid deep behind Federal lines to interrupt the
flow of supplies and chose to strike the Union garrison at Murfreesboro,
Tennessee. The town, garrisoned by about 1,500 men primarily from the 9th Michigan and 3rd Minnesota infantry regiments, held a large supply depot and was an important point upon the railroad leading to Chattanooga.
Riding
in at dawn, Forrest’s 1,400 troopers, men from Georgia, Texas, Kentucky, and
Tennessee struck hard at the camp of the 9th Michigan north of town.
“At daylight on the morning of the 13th, the 9th Michigan
was awakened by the noise of wagons and cavalry dashing at full speed on the
macadamized road leading to Murfreesboro,” the Detroit Free Press
reported. “The pickets were surprised and captured, but the alarm was given and
the command to form in line obeyed in the camp of the 9th with the
utmost dispatch. Colonel [William W.] Duffield had but time to form the men on
the parade ground in a square to meet the attack of some 800 Texan Rangers who
rushed upon them like a hurricane. But about 175 men, half in undress, had sprung
into line and so fierce was the attack that they were forced back to the center
of the camp.”
1885 reunion image of the 9th Michigan Infantry at Hillsdale. (Michigan State University) |
Colonel
Duffield was wounded twice in the initial attack and was carried off to the
Maney house (Oaklands Mansion today) to have his wounds dressed, leaving
command to Lieutenant Colonel John G. Parkhurst. Parkhurst directed that his
men build a breastwork of hay bales and prepare for the next attack. “The hope
was entertained by the Michigan men that they might keep off the enemy until
they could either succeed in making a junction with the 3rd
Minnesota, or that they would force their way through,” to the Michiganders the
Free Press reported. It was not
to be.
A few miles away along the Nashville Pike, Colonel Henry Lester of the 3rd formed his regiment into line and with Hewett’s 1st Kentucky battery fended off repeated attacks from Forrest’s men but would not march to join with the 9th Michigan. A couple of messengers from the 9th Michigan made it to Lester’s position to report their condition, but Lester had them arrested as spies. The sounds of the engagement across the river were painfully evident, and the smoke pouring from the supply depot made it clear the Confederates were gaining the upper hand. Near noon, Forrest turned his attention back to Parkhurst and send him a demand for “an immediate surrender or he would put his whole remaining force to the sword.” Parkhurst, down to roughly 100 effective men, surrendered his detachment, and a few hours later, Colonel Lester surrendered his men as well in circumstances to be detailed below.
The
editor of the Athens Post ticked off the spoils of Forrest’s “brilliant
affair. The number of Yankees killed and wounded is 125; prisoners captured
total 1,250 including the 3rd Minnesota regiment, the 9th
Michigan regiment, the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 150 of Hewett’s
Kentucky battery of four guns (two brass and two steel), 300 horses and mules,
60 wagons, several ambulance, and 2,000 stand of arms. The Federal camps with
all their contents embracing a large lot of new clothing were burned as was
also the depot at Murfreesboro containing near half a million dollars’ worth of
quartermaster and commissary stores. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded
was about 46.” Forrest's victory was the first of a series of cavalry raids and attacks that
eventually forced General Don Carlos Buell to suspend his drive on Chattanooga;
by early September, with Bragg’s Kentucky campaign in full swing, Buell would
be on the march for Louisville, Kentucky and the Confederacy would regain
control of large swaths of the rich foraging grounds of Tennessee.
Forrest’s triumph was an embarrassing defeat for the
western Federals who to this point in the war had nearly run the table on their
Butternut opponents. The Cincinnati Commercial labeled it “the
Murfreesboro disgrace” and pilloried Colonel Henry Lester of the 3rd
Minnesota as the villain of the affair. Lester’s own regimental surgeon stated
that the colonel had been “stupefied” by Forrest’s attack and “utterly
paralyzed by fear” he surrendered his regiment. “The men wept like children
with mortification and rage, but Colonel Lester would listen to no remonstrance
and so the regiment of fine, stalwart, admirably drilled and armed men gave up
to a parcel of cavalry,” Surgeon Butler reported.
Four soldiers of Co. F of the 3rd Minnesota pose in their camp at Nashville, Tennessee. (Minnesota State Historical Society) |
Adjutant Cyrene H. Blakeley of the 3rd Minnesota
provided the following cohesive account of the Murfreesboro “affair” to the Louisville
Journal shortly after the battle. Interestingly, Blakeley had left
Murfreesboro the day before Forrest’s raid and was in Nashville awaiting
transportation North for recruiting duty when word arrived of the battle.
The force at Murfreesboro consisted of six companies of the
9th Michigan, two companies (A and C) of the 4th Kentucky
Cavalry, nine companies of the 3rd Minnesota, and four pieces of
Hewett’s 1st Kentucky Battery. The 9th Michigan and the
cavalry [4th Kentucky] were encamped in the edge of the town [on the
grounds of Oaklands Mansion] and the 3rd Minnesota and the battery
were a mile and half outside on the Nashville Pike. The forces are part of the
23rd Brigade which is commanded by Colonel William W. Duffield.
General Thomas T. Crittenden assumed command of the post on Friday night.
The attack was made on Sunday morning at 4 o’clock upon the
cavalry and the 9th Michigan, they being completely surprised. So
large was the attacking party that the infantry could not form in line of
battle and after fighting as best they could for several hours, the Michigan
regiment surrendered. Our cavalry was of no assistance whatever; not a man
mounted his horse and but one or two escaped.
In the meantime, a portion of the enemy had burned the
railroad depot and freight house which contained commissary stores and a large
warehouse containing forage and quartermaster’s stores. Having compelled the
surrender of the cavalry and infantry in town, they broke for the battery.
Colonel Lester had been advised of the attack and placed the battery on a knoll
a quarter of a mile from his camp with his own regiment to support it. The
Rebels passed around to the north of the camp and driving through it, they
burned the officers’ tents and killed or wounded the guards. As they came out
of the woods to make the attack, Colonel Lester retained his fire until they
were within 40 paces of him when the battery was opened upon them. They were
completely disorganized and retired in the greatest confusion. Upon the next
charge the infantry and battery both fired, and the enemy was thrown into
confusion a second time.
Not relishing such treatment, a portion of the Rebels went
round to the rear for the purpose of attacking us there as well as in front.
This, however, was of no avail for Colonel Lester formed his men in a square
and Captain Hewett directed his pieces both ways. A third attempt was made to
cut the brave men to pieces, but the result was the same as before. The Rebels
retired for a while and Captain Hewett turned his pieces upon the town,
shelling it in the most approved style. It is said the town was badly damaged
and at last accounts was on fire in several places.
The fighting commenced again at noon and continued unabated
until 3 o’clock when a flag of truce from the enemy appeared stating that the 9th
Michigan had surrendered early in the day and demanding the unconditional
surrender by the remainder of the forces. It is said that a threat was also
made that if Colonel Lester did not surrender, General Crittenden and Colonel
Duffield, who were taken out of the beds by the enemy at the outset [italics
original], would be immediately shot. Colonel Lester rode into town under
protection of the flag of truce and ascertained that he had to encounter a
force of about 4,000 and that he could rely only on his little handful of men
to sustain himself. His ammunition, too,
had nearly given out and the battery had only 65 rounds of case and solid shot
while the infantry had but a few rounds of cartridges left. He returned and
after consultation with Captain Hewett and his own officers, it was determined
to surrender which was done about 5 p.m.
Colonel Lester had been deceived by Forrest; the cavalry
numbered roughly 1,400 troopers and while Lester was in town, Forrest had the
men parade in such a manner that it appeared that he had far more troops than
he actually did. Forrest’s threat to shoot the captured officers was pure
bunkum and a typical Forrest scare tactic, similar to his earlier threat to
Parkhurst that he would put the whole command to the sword. Armed with the
deception and believing Forrest’s threats, Lester brought back the news to his
officers and in a secret ballot, they voted to keep fighting. But Lester would
have none of it; he insisted that they surrender and after another ballot,
Lester received the vote he wanted. Later
that evening, Forrest had dinner at the Maney mansion with the senior captured
Federal officers and presumably Lester then learned how he had been deceived. One
of Lester’s men later wrote that in Lester, “the boys were deceived; he was a
noble-appearing man, a first-rate drillmaster, great for show, but the pluck
wasn’t there.”
History
has not been kind to Colonel Lester who, along with the officers who voted to
surrender, was dismissed from the service after Murfreesboro; the officers and
soldiers of the 9th Michigan spared few words in condemning Lester,
and Lester’s own men were hardly in a forgiving mood after his actions saddled
them with the reputation as cowards and quitters. But the fact is that the two
regiments were camped too far apart to provide mutual support and when
Forrest’s men made their attack, they were able to leverage their advantage of
numbers to isolate and defeat the two pockets of Federal resistance.
But
it is clear that Federal command confusion also contributed to this defeat.
General Thomas T. Crittenden was in command of the post of Murfreesboro, but he
did not command the troops per se, and besides had only arrived on Friday
evening July 11th. The 9th Michigan, 3rd
Minnesota, and Hewett’s Battery formed the 23rd Brigade which was
under the command of Colonel Duffield of the 9th. However, Colonel
Duffield had been away for several weeks and did not arrive until late Saturday
evening July 12th and had not yet formally resumed command of the
brigade, which left Colonel Henry Lester of the 3rd Minnesota as
nominal brigade commander.
Rumors
persisted of jealousies and problems between Lester and Parkhurst and this is
why their regiments were camped so far apart; General Crittenden noted a
certain looseness in the discipline and control of the troops at Murfreesboro
when he arrived to take command. Soldiers of the 3rd Minnesota
blamed Lester’s actions during the battle on either love or whiskey or both;
presumably the bachelor colonel had made a social visit to the Maney mansion
the night before the attack and had returned to camp stone drunk, spending half
the night barfing up his evening reverie. Darker rumors suggested that Lester
had fallen in love with a local woman who drugged the unsuspecting colonel. The
impact of being hung over or drugged on Lester’s subsequent battlefield
performance is not hard to imagine.
Sources:
Walter N. Trenerry.
“Lester’s Surrender at Murfreesboro,” Minnesota History, Spring 1965,
pgs. 191-197
“The Ninth Michigan
Regiment: Full Account of the Affair at Murfreesboro,” Detroit Free Press
(Michigan), August 2, 1862, pg. 1
“The Capture of
Murfreesboro,” Detroit Free Press (Michigan), August 8, 1862, pg. 1
“The Confederate Victory
at Murfreesboro,” Athens Post (Tennessee), July 25, 1862, pg. 2
“The Minnesota Third,” St.
Cloud Democrat (Minnesota), July 31, 1862, pg. 2
“The Affair at
Murfreesboro, Tenn.-Full Particulars,” Fox Lake Gazette (Wisconsin),
July 23, 1862, pg. 3 (republished from Louisville Journal)
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