The Night Attack at Harker’s Crossing

Monday December 29, 1862, was marked by a pair of Federal missteps that can be attributed to poor intelligence of the Confederate positions near Murfreesboro and an overeagerness in pursuit. The first of these two incidents occurred in the afternoon on the west side of the battlefield when the Anderson Troop dashed across Overall’s Creek right into the skirmish lines of the 10th South Carolina of Colonel Arthur M. Manigault’s brigade. In a sharp little scrap, the Pennsylvanians took the worst of it, losing both of their majors (Frank Ward and Adolph Rosengarten), the net result being that McCook’s wing went into camp on the west bank of Overall’s Creek, not quite having achieved connection with the rest of Rosecrans’ army.

          The second misstep occurred on the eastern side of the battlefield and proved a more serious engagement. It occurred at what is today known as Harker’s Crossing, a ford on Stones River located near what is now the Stones River Country Club. General John C. Breckinridge’s division held this sector of the Confederate line and the Orphan Brigade under Brigadier General Roger W. Hanson was on the left of the line guarding the crossing from positions on Wayne’s Hill.

Wood's desire to be the first to reach Murfreesboro coupled with Rosecrans' order to seize the town brought about the engagement at Harker's Crossing on the night of December 29, 1862. Wood selected Colonel Charles G. Harker's brigade for the assignment which eventually proved a case of biting off more than he could chew. Harker was lucky to extricate his brigade from the opposite bank of the river with as few casualties as he did. The stage was set for the two armies to clash at the Battle of Stones River.


          It was approaching sunset when two divisions of General Thomas L. Crittenden’s corps [Thomas J. Wood and John Palmer] arrived at the two-mile marker near the Cowan House, so close that they could see the spires of Murfreesboro in the dim distance. “On arriving within two-and-a-half miles of Murfreesboro, the evidence was perfectly unmistakable that the enemy was in force immediately in our front prepared to resist seriously and determinedly our farther advance,” General Wood reported. “His troops, displayed in battle array, were plainly to be seen in our front. Up to this moment, the information received had indicated that the enemy would evacuate Murfreesboro, offering no serious opposition. But observations assured me that we should meet with a determined resistance.”

As Palmer’s and Wood’s men deployed into position, they were surprised to receive an order from Rosecrans (via Crittenden) directing them to push into town. “Stanley reports from Triune that the people say Bragg has abandoned Murfreesboro,” the order read. “You will therefore occupy the place with one division and camp your others near them.” Rosecrans later claimed in his official report that he had received a signal emanating from General Palmer that stated that “he was in sight of Murfreesboro, and that the enemy were running.” Hence, Rosecrans gave the order to take the town mistakenly thinking that Bragg had abandoned it.

Both Wood and Palmer saw the order was folly, but until they were able to persuade Crittenden to call off Rosecrans’ directive, Wood ordered Colonel Charles Garrison Harker’s brigade to cross Stones River at a ford and march into town. It was a reconnaissance in force granting the possibility that Rosey’s intelligence was right. Earlier in the day, Wood had commented that he was determined to be the first to reach town and now he had his chance. Besides Wood’s trained eye spied the commanding height of Wayne’s Hill looming over his line, clearly the key to the battlefield. If Harker’s men could seize it, it would prove of great value if there was to be a fight for Murfreesboro.

Captain Milton T. Russell
Co. A, 51st Indiana

Night attacks were almost unheard of during the war, and Harker’s men were about to demonstrate why. “Throwing a strong line of skirmishers over the stream, orders were given to the 51st Indiana, 13th Michigan, and 73rd Indiana to cross simultaneously, form on the opposite bank, press forward, and seize the commanding heights beyond,” Harker reported. It was nearly dark before his men found the ford and splashed across Stones River with Captain Milton Russell of Co. A of the 51st Indiana leading the skirmishers. “As we were fully aware that the enemy occupied the opposite bank and as none of our troops had up to that time crossed the river, it was necessary to proceed cautiously to avoid running into an ambuscade,” recalled William Hartpence of the 51st Indiana. “We moved down and crossed the river, wading it with the water in some places up to our hips,” recalled Captain Russell. “Talk about cold water or a cold bath, it was so cold that our teeth chattered! As the company was nearing the opposite shore, a terrific volley was fired from behind a rail fence not over 40 steps in our front. The enemy, being on higher ground than we, fired too high, their bullets taking effect in the regiment that was standing in line where we left them on the opposite side of the river.”

“There were but two ways out of the trap: one was to recross the river; the other was to advance,” Russell continued. “It flashed through my mind that their guns were empty, ours loaded. I gave the command ‘On the right into line, double quick, charge!’ And in less time than it takes to tell it, we were over that fence. The boys emptied their guns, fixed bayonets, and went at them. The Johnnies gave way and Co. A followed right on their heels.” Captain Russell would be awarded the Medal of Honor in 1897 as “the first man to cross Stones River in the face of a galling fire from the concealed skirmishers of the enemy, leading his skirmishers up the hillside, and driving the opposing skirmishers before them.” He later wrote that “had the charge proved a failure I would have been court-martialed for exceeding my orders.”

In the vanguard of this night attack was William Hartpence of the 51st Indiana who tells the rest of the story:

 

Our skirmishers rushed forward on the double quick and charged upon the Rebels who instantly fled from their hiding places. At the same time, it was discovered that a large number were concealed in a field of standing corn on the hillside and fearing they would overwhelm our skirmishers, the whole regiment was hastened forward at the double quick. Before the regiment had entirely crossed the river, information came that the Rebels were advancing in line of battle just beyond the crest of the ridge about 400 yards to our front. It was at once determined to seize the crest before the Rebels could get there, if possible. So, we started on the run forward.

      The entire ridge seemed to issue forth a continuous flame of fire, yet not a man faltered, but each seemed to strive to reach the desired point in advance of his comrades. The boldness of the movement and alacrity with which it was executed with a well-directed fire struck terror to the Rebels who fell back in dire confusion. Orders came just then to advance no further but to hold our position. Colonel Abel Streight ordered the men to lie die so as to conceal them as much as possible and in a few minutes the Rebels were seen advancing on our position.

    They were allowed to come within 30 steps when we opened fire on them with such effect that they hardly waited for a reply, but broke and fled again. In a few minutes, reinforcements joined us on our right and left and we remained there without further molestation until about 10 o’clock that night when orders came to retire to the opposite bank of the river. After waiting till the rest of the brigade had crossed, the 51st Indiana followed at the same time withdrawing our skirmishers in good order.

 

“Our unquenchable zeal ought to have carried us right into Murfreesboro that night, but it didn’t,” Wilbur Hinman of the 65th Ohio confessed. “In fact, everybody was glad enough when the order to retire reached us. We did not know much about war yet, but it seemed to us that our advance was a mistake.” While most of the Federals may have been relieved to be back on safer ground, Colonel Michael Shoemaker of the 13th Michigan was convinced that a golden opportunity was lost that night on Wayne’s Hill. “If our advance had not been stopped by order of our own superior officers, we would have surprised the enemy before they could have formed their ranks and driven them from their position which would have left Murfreesboro open to us without further fighting. The Confederates evidently were not expecting us to cross Stones River so late in the day and were, in my opinion, not prepared to offer an effectual resistance to our advance had it continued,” he opined. Ed Porter Thompson of the Confederate 6th Kentucky agreed with Shoemaker, stating that “the loss of this important position would have thoroughly disconcerted all the plans of Bragg and changed the entire aspect of the battle. The Federals being once established upon it, the natural strength of Bragg’s position would have been rendered nugatory.”

 

Source:

Hartpence, William R. History of the 51st Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry. Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Co., 1894, pgs. 105-106

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