Blue and Gray View of Seven Pines: With Casey's Division on May 31, 1862
On the receiving end of General Daniel Harvey Hill’s divisional attack on the afternoon of May 31, 1862, were the three brigades of General Silas Casey’s division. Casey’s division, mostly composed of newly raised troops with little combat experience, wilted in the heat of the Confederate attack and bore much of the blame from the rest of the army for the misfortunes of the day.
“Casey’s division is used up and
will, it is thought, never go into battle again,” commented Sergeant John
Whipple of the 92nd New York. “We got no praise for what we did at
Seven Pines, although we held the field against desperate odds for a long time.
McClellan gives us no credit for it. Casey’s men lost far more men than any other
in proportion to their number and yet, because we had to retreat before the
superior numbers that threatened to outflank us and take us prisoners, and
because our retreat was not conducted in a proper military manner…McClellan
says we behaved shamefully. The men, in consequence, are discouraged and many swear
that they will never fight again for they do not like to be blamed after
suffering what they have for their country.”
Among the wounded of Casey’s division was Corporal Mortimer Daniels of the 100th New York. Daniels’ regiment, part of General Henry Naglee’s brigade, lay directly in the path of the 6th Alabama’s assault described by Captain George Hooper as featured in yesterday’s post. Speaking with a reporter in a hospital near Washington, D.C. about a week after the battle, Corporal Daniels testified of ferocity of the Confederate assault at Seven Pines and the desperate efforts of Casey’s men to halt it. Daniels’ account first saw publication in the June 11, 1862, edition of the Buffalo Morning Express.
On Saturday
about 11 a.m., the 100th New York was called and formed into line;
the arms were stacked and the men laid down, ordered to hold themselves ready
to move. A ration of whiskey was served and at about 1 p.m., Colonel Brown
ordered the men to take their arms as the enemy had commenced firing on the 100th
from the woods in front of the clearing in which the regiment was lying.
The regiment
was then moved forward in line of battle some ten rods into the slashing and
halted in pretty good order. We opened fire by order and continued firing until
ordered to cease, something like an hour and having discharged their pieces
some 20 times. The order was now given to charge bayonets on the concealed
enemy. The regiment moved some ten rods forward and halted, having been
disarranged by climbing over fallen trees (one part of the regiment having to
climb a rail fence) it was necessary to reform the line.
“I felt a hard pop on the side from a fragment of an exploded shell. One piece struck my canteen and tore it to pieces while another piece struck my sword. I guess it is flying yet for I have never seen it since.” ~ Captain John Nicholson, Co. C, 100th N.Y.
While this was
being done, the enemy in front rose from their concealment in the brush and
opened a heavy fire which did much execution, the distance being some five rods
and at the same moment, it was discovered that the 100th was flanked
right and left, nearly surrounded. Colonel Brown then ordered the regiment to
fall back, which was done in pretty good order, the fallen timber preventing
rapid our regular movement. On reaching the spot where they first began firing,
the regiment halted, faced the enemy, dropped into a good line, and again
commenced firing. Some four or five rounds where they first began firing,
another order was given to retreat to the rifle pits, some 10-15 rods back.
Before reaching the pits, we
fell in with another regiment that was disordered and became mixed up with it. A
ditch full of water intervened in which the men had to jump and much confusion
ensued. This was about 4 p.m. The regiment did not halt at the rifle pits nor
at the first battery, but at the second battery a stand was made and the
regiment, or what remained of it, began to collect. No rations or whiskey were
served until Monday noon when some 200 men were collected.
No man in the regiment flinched, but on the contrary Peter Tracy says he had to go two rods ahead and seize William Seely and threaten to shoot him if he did not restrain his ardor and keep in line. The left wing was kept constantly in the advance and displayed great eagerness. Several of the men said their officers had to restrain the men constantly. Many of the men kept one or two rods in advance in spite of the officers.
To learn more about the Battle of Seven Pines/Fair Oaks, I recommend that readers check out Vic Vignola's new title Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks May 31- June 1, 1862 available now from Savas Beatie.
Sources:
Letter from Sergeant John Whipple, Co. I, 92nd New York Volunteer Infantry; Post, Lydia Minturn. Soldiers’ Letters from Camp, Battlefield, and Prison. New York: Bunce & Huntington, 1865, pgs. 93-94
Account from Corporal Mortimer L. Daniels, Co. B, 100th New York Volunteer Infantry, Buffalo Morning Express (New York), June 11, 1862, pg. 3
Account from Captain John Nicholson, Co. C, 100th
New York Volunteer Infantry, Buffalo Morning Express (New York), June 13,
1862, pg. 3
Silas Casey's Division of Erasmus Keyes's IV Corps were greatly harmed by GB McClellan's telegraph message regarding Casey's Division which stated Casey's men "fell back disunitedly & discreditably". The line was picked up by all newspapers and set the narrative that had it not been for Phil Kearny's Division (III Corps), the day would have been lost. In reality, is was McClellan who placed Casey's men in such an exposed position. As is McClellan's forte, he assigned blame rather than acknowledge responsibility.
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