Blue and Gray View of Seven Pines: With Casey's Division on May 31, 1862

On the receiving end of General Daniel Harvey Hill’s divisional attack on the afternoon of May 31, 1862, were the three brigades of General Silas Casey’s division. Casey’s division, mostly composed of newly raised troops with little combat experience, wilted in the heat of the Confederate attack and bore much of the blame from the rest of the army for the misfortunes of the day.       

“Casey’s division is used up and will, it is thought, never go into battle again,” commented Sergeant John Whipple of the 92nd New York. “We got no praise for what we did at Seven Pines, although we held the field against desperate odds for a long time. McClellan gives us no credit for it. Casey’s men lost far more men than any other in proportion to their number and yet, because we had to retreat before the superior numbers that threatened to outflank us and take us prisoners, and because our retreat was not conducted in a proper military manner…McClellan says we behaved shamefully. The men, in consequence, are discouraged and many swear that they will never fight again for they do not like to be blamed after suffering what they have for their country.”

Among the wounded of Casey’s division was Corporal Mortimer Daniels of the 100th New York. Daniels’ regiment, part of General Henry Naglee’s brigade, lay directly in the path of the 6th Alabama’s assault described by Captain George Hooper as featured in yesterday’s post. Speaking with a reporter in a hospital near Washington, D.C. about a week after the battle, Corporal Daniels testified of ferocity of the Confederate assault at Seven Pines and the desperate efforts of Casey’s men to halt it. Daniels’ account first saw publication in the June 11, 1862, edition of the Buffalo Morning Express.



 

This map from the American Battlefield Trust depicts the assault of General D.H. Hill's division upon General Silas Casey's Federals at the outset of the Battle of Seven Pines on May 31, 1862. The 100th New York, the left flank regiment of General Henry Naglee's brigade, was deployed just south of the Williamsburg Stage Road when the 6th Alabama made their assault. 

          On Saturday about 11 a.m., the 100th New York was called and formed into line; the arms were stacked and the men laid down, ordered to hold themselves ready to move. A ration of whiskey was served and at about 1 p.m., Colonel Brown ordered the men to take their arms as the enemy had commenced firing on the 100th from the woods in front of the clearing in which the regiment was lying.

          The regiment was then moved forward in line of battle some ten rods into the slashing and halted in pretty good order. We opened fire by order and continued firing until ordered to cease, something like an hour and having discharged their pieces some 20 times. The order was now given to charge bayonets on the concealed enemy. The regiment moved some ten rods forward and halted, having been disarranged by climbing over fallen trees (one part of the regiment having to climb a rail fence) it was necessary to reform the line.

 

“I felt a hard pop on the side from a fragment of an exploded shell. One piece struck my canteen and tore it to pieces while another piece struck my sword. I guess it is flying yet for I have never seen it since.” ~ Captain John Nicholson, Co. C, 100th N.Y.

 

          While this was being done, the enemy in front rose from their concealment in the brush and opened a heavy fire which did much execution, the distance being some five rods and at the same moment, it was discovered that the 100th was flanked right and left, nearly surrounded. Colonel Brown then ordered the regiment to fall back, which was done in pretty good order, the fallen timber preventing rapid our regular movement. On reaching the spot where they first began firing, the regiment halted, faced the enemy, dropped into a good line, and again commenced firing. Some four or five rounds where they first began firing, another order was given to retreat to the rifle pits, some 10-15 rods back.

Before reaching the pits, we fell in with another regiment that was disordered and became mixed up with it. A ditch full of water intervened in which the men had to jump and much confusion ensued. This was about 4 p.m. The regiment did not halt at the rifle pits nor at the first battery, but at the second battery a stand was made and the regiment, or what remained of it, began to collect. No rations or whiskey were served until Monday noon when some 200 men were collected.

No man in the regiment flinched, but on the contrary Peter Tracy says he had to go two rods ahead and seize William Seely and threaten to shoot him if he did not restrain his ardor and keep in line. The left wing was kept constantly in the advance and displayed great eagerness. Several of the men said their officers had to restrain the men constantly. Many of the men kept one or two rods in advance in spite of the officers. 


To learn more about the Battle of Seven Pines/Fair Oaks, I recommend that readers check out Vic Vignola's new title Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks May 31- June 1, 1862 available now from Savas Beatie

Sources:

Letter from Sergeant John Whipple, Co. I, 92nd New York Volunteer Infantry; Post, Lydia Minturn. Soldiers’ Letters from Camp, Battlefield, and Prison. New York: Bunce & Huntington, 1865, pgs. 93-94

Account from Corporal Mortimer L. Daniels, Co. B, 100th New York Volunteer Infantry, Buffalo Morning Express (New York), June 11, 1862, pg. 3

Account from Captain John Nicholson, Co. C, 100th New York Volunteer Infantry, Buffalo Morning Express (New York), June 13, 1862, pg. 3

Comments

  1. Silas Casey's Division of Erasmus Keyes's IV Corps were greatly harmed by GB McClellan's telegraph message regarding Casey's Division which stated Casey's men "fell back disunitedly & discreditably". The line was picked up by all newspapers and set the narrative that had it not been for Phil Kearny's Division (III Corps), the day would have been lost. In reality, is was McClellan who placed Casey's men in such an exposed position. As is McClellan's forte, he assigned blame rather than acknowledge responsibility.

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