A Missed Opportunity at Harker’s Crossing
Nighttime attacks were rare during the Civil War but on the night of Monday, December 29, 1862, Colonel Charles G. Harker’s brigade of the Army of the Cumberland received just such a directive and the consequences proved a near disaster.
Colonel Michael Shoemaker of the 13th
Michigan was part of Harker’s attack and recalled the night as one of a missed
opportunity. “I have always been of the opinion that if our advance had not
been stopped by order of our own superior officers, we would have surprised the
enemy before they could have formed their ranks and would have driven them from
their position,” he wrote in 1878. “This would have left Murfreesboro open to
us without further fighting or opposition. The Confederates would have
retreated to the Tennessee River without giving us battle.”
Colonel Shoemaker’s description of the events of December 29, 1862, is derived from his lengthy account of the Battle of Stones River which he presented to the 1878 meeting of the Pioneer Society of Michigan.

Colonel Michael Shoemaker, 13th Michigan Infantry
Monday morning, December 29, 1862,
broke bright and pleasant, the birds singing as though all the world was at
peace and as happy as they. Our army resumed its march and we advanced to
Stones River under continuous fire from the Confederates. Our brigade struck
the river at the ford just below Murfreesboro where it bends to the east and on
the east side of the railroad.
About sunset we were ordered to cross
the river and force our way into Murfreesboro. My regiment was on the left and
in the advance with Co. A under Lieutenant George Van Arsdale and Co. I under
Lieutenant James Slayton thrown forward as skirmishers under the command of
Major Culver. The Confederate troops occupied the opposite bank and as we
entered the river we received a perfect shower of balls which did us no damage
as they all passed over our heads, but they kept up a disagreeable pattering in
the leaves and branches under which we were advancing.
The ground occupied by the enemy was much higher than the river and this probably was the cause of their shotting wide of the mark. They retired as we advanced and we continued our onward march up the bank, through the woods, until we reached a cornfield where we halted and corrected our alignment. I found my regiment quite in advance and considerably overlapping the 51st Indiana. In getting my regiment into position, I placed part of my men so that they could enfilade any force approaching us.
“When in line in the cornfield, and receiving the third volley from the enemy, we were ordered to fix bayonets and prepare to receive a charge of cavalry. As my regiment was somewhat in advance of the 51st Indiana, and my right covering their left, I moved my regiment to the left, and rear, so as to connect with the 51st Indiana, but still leaving my left somewhat in advance, and in such a position as would have enabled us to enfilade any force which might charge the center. Our position was now a very strong one, being in the edge of the woods. Here we remained until ordered to recross the river.” ~ Colonel Michael Shoemaker’s official report
The entire brigade was now ordered to lie down on their arms
and await further orders. It was now quite dark and it was evident that the
Confederates were in front in force but not in battle array. I could distinctly
hear their officers giving words of command and that apparently in hot haste
for the purpose of securing a proper formation to resist our attack. [The Confederates
included the 9th Kentucky Infantry under Colonel Thomas H. Hunt
along with detachments from other regiments of the Orphan Brigade.]
I have always been of the opinion that if our advance had not
been stopped by order of our own superior officers, we would have surprised the
enemy before they could have formed their ranks and would have driven them from
their position. This would have left Murfreesboro open to us without further
fighting or opposition. The Confederates would have retreated to the Tennessee
River without giving us battle, but as it had to be fought, perhaps the ground
was as favorable for us here as it would have been elsewhere. The Confederates
were evidently not expecting us to cross Stones River so late in the day and
were not, in my opinion, prepared to offer an effectual resistance to our
advance had it continued directly upon them after reaching the cornfield in
which we halted.
While our forces were lying in the cornfield between 9-10
p.m., the enemy, who had now gotten into line, poured volley after volley into
what they supposed was our position. They were correct in locating my regiment
and had not my men been lying down, our loss would have been quite large for the
bullets rattled among the cornstalks above our heads like hail stones. As it
was, we had but two casualties; one boy was wounded within a few feet of myself
and orderly sergeant Walter DeLong of Co. F who was in advance in the skirmish
line who was killed. Thus, the first man wounded and the first killed at the Battle
of Stones River belonged to the 13th Michigan.
About 11 p.m. we were ordered to recross the river, which we did as silently as possible, and my regiment bivouacked in the open field on the rising ground near the river. I was very much fatigued, having been on the move since 3 o’clock in the morning. Randall, my attendant, took my saddle from my horse, placed it on the ground as a pillow with a thin rubber blanket as a mattress and on it I stretched myself with my cap on my head, booted, and spurred, my sword buckled on my side. In fact, I lay down accoutered as I had been throughout the day. My head was hardly on the saddle before I was sound asleep although the crack of the musket could still be heard quite frequently. Adjutant Joshua Culver said to me the next morning, “Colonel, your head was not fairly on the saddle before you commenced snoring and you snored so loudly that I could not get to sleep for an hour.” I want it understood that ordinarily I do not snore at all, but at this time owing to the extraordinary fatigue I had undergone I had undoubtedly made some lively music of that kind.
To learn more about the fighting at Harker's Crossing, please check out "The Night Attack at Harker's Crossing" which gives the perspective of men from the 51st Indiana in this important opening engagement of the Battle of Stones River.
Source:
“Narrative of Colonel Michael Shoemaker of the part taken by the 13th Regiment Michigan Volunteer Infantry in the Battle of Stone River,” 1878 Annual Meeting of the Pioneer Society of Michigan
To learn more about the Stones River campaign, be sure to check out my book "Hell by the Acre: A Narrative History of the Stones River Campaign" available now from Savas Beatie.

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