A Missed Opportunity at Harker’s Crossing

Nighttime attacks were rare during the Civil War but on the night of Monday, December 29, 1862, Colonel Charles G. Harker’s brigade of the Army of the Cumberland received just such a directive and the consequences proved a near disaster.

          Colonel Michael Shoemaker of the 13th Michigan was part of Harker’s attack and recalled the night as one of a missed opportunity. “I have always been of the opinion that if our advance had not been stopped by order of our own superior officers, we would have surprised the enemy before they could have formed their ranks and would have driven them from their position,” he wrote in 1878. “This would have left Murfreesboro open to us without further fighting or opposition. The Confederates would have retreated to the Tennessee River without giving us battle.”

          Colonel Shoemaker’s description of the events of December 29, 1862, is derived from his lengthy account of the Battle of Stones River which he presented to the 1878 meeting of the Pioneer Society of Michigan.

 

Colonel Michael Shoemaker, 13th Michigan Infantry 

          Monday morning, December 29, 1862, broke bright and pleasant, the birds singing as though all the world was at peace and as happy as they. Our army resumed its march and we advanced to Stones River under continuous fire from the Confederates. Our brigade struck the river at the ford just below Murfreesboro where it bends to the east and on the east side of the railroad.

          About sunset we were ordered to cross the river and force our way into Murfreesboro. My regiment was on the left and in the advance with Co. A under Lieutenant George Van Arsdale and Co. I under Lieutenant James Slayton thrown forward as skirmishers under the command of Major Culver. The Confederate troops occupied the opposite bank and as we entered the river we received a perfect shower of balls which did us no damage as they all passed over our heads, but they kept up a disagreeable pattering in the leaves and branches under which we were advancing.

          The ground occupied by the enemy was much higher than the river and this probably was the cause of their shotting wide of the mark. They retired as we advanced and we continued our onward march up the bank, through the woods, until we reached a cornfield where we halted and corrected our alignment. I found my regiment quite in advance and considerably overlapping the 51st Indiana. In getting my regiment into position, I placed part of my men so that they could enfilade any force approaching us.

“When in line in the cornfield, and receiving the third volley from the enemy, we were ordered to fix bayonets and prepare to receive a charge of cavalry. As my regiment was somewhat in advance of the 51st Indiana, and my right covering their left, I moved my regiment to the left, and rear, so as to connect with the 51st Indiana, but still leaving my left somewhat in advance, and in such a position as would have enabled us to enfilade any force which might charge the center.  Our position was now a very strong one, being in the edge of the woods. Here we remained until ordered to recross the river.” ~ Colonel Michael Shoemaker’s official report

 

The entire brigade was now ordered to lie down on their arms and await further orders. It was now quite dark and it was evident that the Confederates were in front in force but not in battle array. I could distinctly hear their officers giving words of command and that apparently in hot haste for the purpose of securing a proper formation to resist our attack. [The Confederates included the 9th Kentucky Infantry under Colonel Thomas H. Hunt along with detachments from other regiments of the Orphan Brigade.]

I have always been of the opinion that if our advance had not been stopped by order of our own superior officers, we would have surprised the enemy before they could have formed their ranks and would have driven them from their position. This would have left Murfreesboro open to us without further fighting or opposition. The Confederates would have retreated to the Tennessee River without giving us battle, but as it had to be fought, perhaps the ground was as favorable for us here as it would have been elsewhere. The Confederates were evidently not expecting us to cross Stones River so late in the day and were not, in my opinion, prepared to offer an effectual resistance to our advance had it continued directly upon them after reaching the cornfield in which we halted.

While our forces were lying in the cornfield between 9-10 p.m., the enemy, who had now gotten into line, poured volley after volley into what they supposed was our position. They were correct in locating my regiment and had not my men been lying down, our loss would have been quite large for the bullets rattled among the cornstalks above our heads like hail stones. As it was, we had but two casualties; one boy was wounded within a few feet of myself and orderly sergeant Walter DeLong of Co. F who was in advance in the skirmish line who was killed. Thus, the first man wounded and the first killed at the Battle of Stones River belonged to the 13th Michigan.

About 11 p.m. we were ordered to recross the river, which we did as silently as possible, and my regiment bivouacked in the open field on the rising ground near the river. I was very much fatigued, having been on the move since 3 o’clock in the morning. Randall, my attendant, took my saddle from my horse, placed it on the ground as a pillow with a thin rubber blanket as a mattress and on it I stretched myself with my cap on my head, booted, and spurred, my sword buckled on my side. In fact, I lay down accoutered as I had been throughout the day. My head was hardly on the saddle before I was sound asleep although the crack of the musket could still be heard quite frequently. Adjutant Joshua Culver said to me the next morning, “Colonel, your head was not fairly on the saddle before you commenced snoring and you snored so loudly that I could not get to sleep for an hour.” I want it understood that ordinarily I do not snore at all, but at this time owing to the extraordinary fatigue I had undergone I had undoubtedly made some lively music of that kind.

To learn more about the fighting at Harker's Crossing, please check out "The Night Attack at Harker's Crossing" which gives the perspective of men from the 51st Indiana in this important opening engagement of the Battle of Stones River. 

Source:

“Narrative of Colonel Michael Shoemaker of the part taken by the 13th Regiment Michigan Volunteer Infantry in the Battle of Stone River,” 1878 Annual Meeting of the Pioneer Society of Michigan


To learn more about the Stones River campaign, be sure to check out my book "Hell by the Acre: A Narrative History of the Stones River Campaign" available now from Savas Beatie.

Comments

Most Popular Posts

Arming the Buckeyes: Longarms of the Ohio Infantry Regiments

Arming the Union: Federal Contract Model 1861 Springfield Rifle Muskets

Bullets for the Union: Manufacturing Small Arms Ammunition During the Civil War

Dressing the Rebels: How to Dye Butternut Jeans Cloth

The Vaunted Enfield Rifle Musket

Arming the Empire State: Arms Issues to New York Infantry Regiments in 1861

Old Abe: The Magnificent War Eagle of the 8th Wisconsin

Cotton Burning on the Levee: A Civilian Witnesses the Federal Seizure of New Orleans

Grant's Bodyguard: An Illinois Trooper at Fort Donelson

A Different Vista on the Civil War: An "Ohio" Marked Lorenz Rifle