Moving Upon the Tender Places of the Confederacy: General Hazen on the Atlanta Campaign

In the aftermath of the three Confederate offensives to defend Atlanta in late July 1864, General William B. Hazen, then leading the Second Brigade of the Third Division of the Fourth Army Corps (Army of the Cumberland), wrote this extraordinary letter to a friend back in Ohio. The Atlanta campaign had just passed its bloodiest period, but Hazen believed that the true battlefront was not in Georgia: it was at the ballot box back in Ohio. One of the nation’s foremost fighting generals saw that the true power for ending the rebellion rested in the hands of the civilians, not the army. “Our first great battle must be at the ballot box and the war power must be sustained at all hazards,” he opined. Hazen believed that by August 1864, the army could not win or lose the war: that result depended on the civilians.

 

"Our first great battle must be at the ballot box and the war power must be sustained at all hazards," General Hazen wrote in August 1864. Hazen felt that Lincoln's defeat would be worth "50 Manassas" victories. 

Yet Hazen and his comrades had ample work before them. John Bell Hood and his legions of the Army of Tennessee, battered and bruised but still standing, stood behind stout entrenchments around Atlanta. The next month would decide the fate of the campaign, and although General Hazen and his brigade had seen plenty of hard fighting since the Atlanta campaign began in May, more fighting was still to come. Hazen felt confident at the end result, looking at it as a matter of attrition and leadership. The change in Confederate commanders to Hood was welcomed by Hazen, who judged that Hood had half the military ability of the departed Joseph E. Johnson. “We are losing some good officers and men but I wish all could understand how vitally this campaign is striking the rebellion,” Hazen wrote. “Did you read Governor [Joseph] Brown’s proclamation calling out the militia and detailed men? There was no blossoming palmetto about that, but a plain and open groan, showing clearly how deep the travels of our army are moving down upon the tender places of the Confederacy.  

Just a few weeks after writing this letter, Hazen left the Army of the Cumberland for a promotion to division commander in the 15^th Army Corps of the Army of the Tennessee where he remained for the rest of the war.

 

Near Atlanta, Georgia

August 2, 1864

          You are, without doubt, at home as I would like to be for a short time. The campaign is running into its fourth month with scarcely a day but a large part of the command is under fire. My losses in killed and wounded are already over a thousand, but this is no fair proportion of the losses of our army as the fates have as usually put me in warm places.

          Will the people keep up their pluck and fight the thing out? It all depends on their steadfastness of purpose. If Richmond does not fall sooner, the army of the West will finally make its way to the back door. If none of the eastern Rebel army comes here, we will wear this one out before the close of the season and it is but a matter of time when the entire force of the enemy must waste away. Will the people hold out?

Johnston’s veteran army by his official report of June 25^th contained 46,628 arms bearing men including 6,631 of Wheeler’s Cavalry [A report of June 30^th shows a total of 62,747 men of all arms in the Army of Tennessee]. They have lost since that time 5,000 prisoners and in their three assaults upon our works since arriving in front of the place at least 20,000 men. [Official reports indicate losses of 2,500 at Peach Tree Creek, 5,500 at Atlanta, and 3,000 at Ezra Church, or roughly 11,000 men] They have received from Mississippi 3,500 men with Stephen D. Lee and are receiving from Governor [Joseph] Brown’s proclamation about 8,000 militia. This gives them today an army of about 25,000 veterans and 8,000 militia, 33,000 in all.

Union graves on the Peach Tree Creek battlefield north of Atlanta in 1864

These figures are substantially correct. The hope of being reinforced by Kirby Smith is at last given up and after exhausting the militia of Alabama and eastern Mississippi, which may amount to 10,000 more, if they have the power to force them out. I cannot for my life see how the enemy can make up the wastage of their army. I do not pretend to say what our losses have been since leaving Chattanooga, but probably from all causes not less than [blank]. But I know the Rebel army when it was joined by Polk just before the fight at Resaca was 71,000 strong. This included Polk and that beside the additions before mentioned it has received a brigade (Harting’s) of at least 3,000 from Mobile. This gives the enormous loss to them since the campaign began of 52,000 men. What possible chance is there for these 33,000 now before us? These figures may seem like exaggerations, but they are not; they are realities and when it is remembered that the Rebels have lost 12,000 prisoners, have had no less than 12 engagements where from one to three corps have been in battle combined with the ordinary desertions and losses from disease, the 52,000 is readily made up. What will hinder the daily attrition of the next three months from completing the overthrow of the fore before us?

You will say, perhaps, why not assault so contemptible a foe, and put him out of his misery at once? The art of war here is no longer a chance matter. Both armies convey a full supply of entrenching tools, and no forces on either side ever rest till they have before them a complete line of works strong enough to resist the heaviest field ordnance with obstructions in the front in the wat of abatis, palisades, and entrenchments that puts the matter of an assault quite out of the question. I think the battle of Chickamauga on the left taught both armies the value of these works. No assault by either side on this campaign has been successful. It would surprise you to see how quickly and willing these men construct their works. None appreciate their value more truly.

We are losing some good officers and men but I wish all could understand how vitally this campaign is striking the rebellion. Did you read Governor Brown’s proclamation calling out the militia and detailed men? There was no blossoming palmetto about that, but a plain and open groan, showing clearly how deep the travels of our army are moving down upon the tender places of the Confederacy.  

General John Bell Hood

You know, of course, that Johnston has been relieved by Hood, a man of just half his ability. Gossip has it that his government was dissatisfied with his continued retreating and sought a man who believed their army could check us. Hardee is said to have been of Johnston’s opinion; that the endeavor to hold Atlanta would be the destruction of the army. Hood was then proferred the command and accepted the task. He has commenced well and had already assaulted us three times losing in all 20,000.
          I have never believed that the above was any true reason for the chance, but that Johnston was taken east to assist in planting a column in Pennsylvania. He knows that country thoroughly. It is the theater of his first operations in 1861. Besides, next to Bragg, he is the first general in their army in point of military ability.

The greatest victory for them, greater than 50 Manassases, and the only one that can give them a particle of hope will be the defeat of the war party at the incoming campaign. If they can, by any possibility, keep their army in the field, no matter whether victorious or not, and a little before the election place a strong army upon the soil of a free state with a fair show of sharp diplomacy upon their part, carelessly met by us, then let the question go flat before the people: peace or war? Who can tell what will be the result of our last three years of blood and victory? I fear nothing in Ohio. Our first great battle must be at the ballot box and the war power must be sustained at all hazards.

 

W.B. Hazen