Negley’s Division Escapes the Beartrap at Davis’ Crossroads
Sergeant Launcelot L. Scott served
a three-year term of service with the 18th Ohio and saw action in
some of the toughest battles of the Civil War, but the tightest spot he was
ever in was at the little-remembered engagement at Davis’ Crossroads in the
days leading up to the battle of Chickamauga.
As relayed in his article from the National Tribune, General James S. Negley’s division of the 14th Corps entered McLemore’s Cove on September 9, 1863 having crossed Lookout Mountain intent on reaching Lafayette, Georgia. The Federal army was operating on the mistaken premise that Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee was in full retreat; as Negley’s division approached Dug Gap, they found themselves confronted in front and on both flanks by determined Confederates. As the situation became clear to General Negley on the afternoon of September 11th, the division was ordered to retreat out of the beartrap set by Bragg and just in time. Sergeant Scott was convinced that the indecision shown by General Thomas C. Hindman saved Negley’s division from more serious loss.
The Confederate reaction at Davis’
Crossroads disabused General George Thomas of the notion that the Army of
Tennessee was still retreating and helped set in motion the events that
culminated in the Battle of Chickamauga about a week later.
On September 9, 1863, Negley’s
division as the advance of the 14th Corps descended the east side of
Lookout Mountain and entered McLemore’s Cove at the head of the Chickamauga
Valley. Beyond the valley seven miles in front of us rose a spur of the Lookout
range named Pigeon Mountain. It was a rather low ridge about 15 miles long and
600-800 feet high, bare in some parts and densely wooded in others. Through it
were several passes called Blue Bird, Dug, and Catlett’s Gaps. These gaps were
narrow and rough, easily defended, and hard to force. In truth, Pigeon Mountain
was a perfect barricade for the enemy and also a perfect screen behind which
they could maneuver unseen. Our destination was Lafayette and to reach it we
had to pass through Dug Gap. We had driven Wheeler’s cavalry from Lookout, and
as soon as we touched the lowland we encountered them again. At 5 p.m., the 18th
Ohio moved out to attack them and after a few shots they retreated across the
creek in the cove and there we halted for the night. On the 10th,
the division moved forward in battle line toward Dug Gap, crossing Mission
Ridge and Chickamauga Creek, passing Bailey’s and Davis’ Crossroads, fighting
all day with the cavalry.
Our regiment passed through a field of the tallest corn any of us had ever seen. Many of the ears could not be reached by the outstretched hand. Soon after reaching the cornfield we were halted and ordered to retire for several hundred yards and formed line again on the front of a road. We had been in a ticklish place, but could see nothing on account of the thick woods. Our skirmish line was thrown out and soon engaged with the Rebel infantry and fought until dark without any gain. The enemy in front was Cleburne’s division supported by Walker’s Corps. Their skirmishers were very bold and very close and after dark threw rocks at ours to draw their fire. One of the 18th Ohio had his eyes injured by a rock. We bivouacked at night in dense pine woods close to the gap and a mile east of Davis’ Crossroads. During the day a body of the enemy was discovered north of us down the valley toward Chattanooga and General Negley sent a regiment from the crossroads to watch and hold them in check.
Sergeant Launcelot L. Scott, 18th OVI |
At daybreak on the 11th,
the firing commenced and kept up all forenoon without any advance on either
side. Our artillery fired a few times without eliciting a reply. At noon our
company relieved the skirmishers on the left of the road, and we soon heard the
whistling of bullets. It was as undesirable a position as a company could be
placed in. The ground was rough, rolling, and very brushy. We were carrying our
knapsacks and they greatly impeded our movements: we could not advance,
retreat, or lie down with any celerity at all. Our men never should have been
sent out to skirmish on brushy ground loaded with their full equipment which
weighed about 50 pounds as it destroyed all of their mobility. In open ground
the knapsack could be used as times as a defense. General [Absalom] Baird with
two of his brigades arrived at noon and was posted at Davis’ Crossroads to
protect our rear from the enemy on the north.
At 3 o’clock he found a large body
of troops advancing against him and advised Negley to withdraw to the
crossroads. This flanking force was General [Thomas C.] Hindman with his own
and Stewart’s and Preston’s divisions, also three commands of cavalry and a
full artillery train. Hindman had been standing at arms on our left flank since
the morning of the 10th under repeated orders from General Bragg to
attack immediately, but he was chary and cautious and his indecision probably
saved us from serious rout. General Negley realized the danger and at 4 o’clock
our line was drawn back to a low ridge on the west side of Chickamauga Creek.
It was a fortunate move and relieved us from any great disaster.
General Patrick Cleburne |
Cleburne pushed after us with his
characteristic energy and we had just gotten into line when one of his
batteries moved up within 400 yards and opened a hot fire with shell and
canister on the left wing of the 18th Ohio and threw it into
disorder. Hearing Cleburne’s guns, Hindman attacked with some spirit, but
failed to reach the road from Lookout to the crossroads. Colonel Timothy R.
Stanley, commanding the Second Brigade, thought we were also attacked by
Martin’s cavalry from the direction of Blue Bird Gap. Our position was found
untenable, as Hindman still threatened our rear, but we held it until dark and
then retired two miles further back to Mission Ridge. The enemy continued their
artillery fire long after we had left and moved into Dug and Catlett’s Gaps in
the night. The loss on our side in this fight was seven killed and 27 wounded.
Early on the 12th the
enemy planted a signal station on Pigeon Mountain south of and near Dug Gap.
Baird and Brannan, who had come down, made a reconnaissance to the crossroads
and found that the enemy had withdrawn to their lairs. On the 14th
we marched out and buried our dead. They were a dreadful sight as three had
lost their heads in the cannonade. I picked up two of the canister balls and
have them yet. I look at them sometimes and think of the awful sound they made
and of the destruction they wrought that day. There was a doubt in the mind of
the highest authority about having been in a critical situation at Dug Gap and
Davis’ Crossroads. General Negley reported to General Thomas that he had been
attacked by superior forces and saved himself by retreating- Thomas reported
the same to the General commanding in Chattanooga, but General Rosecrans had
unfortunately convinced himself that Bragg was retreating to Atlanta as fast as
he could, and instead of coming out to see the situation, wrote back that Nelgey
must have withdrawn more from prudence than compulsion, and was angry because
we were not in LaFayette.
Negley’s men had no doubt whatever
about their having been in great peril. Our sharp repulse and that signal
station convinced us that Bragg’s whole army was near, and it is now known that
more than 60,000 of the enemy were in the gaps and on the east side of the
ridge. Our signal station on Lookout reported great clouds of dust arising
behind its whole length. Pigeon Mountain was a bulwark that would have taxed
the strength of our entire army to force.
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